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ABSTRACT 
The secessionist conflict in southern Philippines 
erupted in the 1970s to assert Muslim self-determination 
and establish a Bangsamoro state. Despite the government’s 
peace efforts, the conflict persisted for more than four 
decades, causing instability and hindering progress in the 
region. For centuries, Muslim sultanates had dominated and 
ruled Mindanao and Sulu based on Islamic laws and 
practices. However, colonization and post-colonial 
influence significantly altered the Muslims’ distinct 
identity as a dominant ethno-religious group of people. 
Notwithstanding strong Muslim resistance, colonial and 
post-colonial rule prevailed and eventually transformed the 
Muslims into the minoritized group in Mindanao.  
This study looked into the impact of colonial and 
post-colonial land ownership and migration policies on the 
rise of Muslim secessionist conflict, and found that 
Muslims were discriminated against, marginalized, and 
dispossessed of their ancestral lands and domination in 
Mindanao. Muslim resentments and grievances that developed 
over time fueled the rise of the contemporary secessionist 
conflict in Mindanao.  
Moro ancestral domain and territory were vital and 
contentious issues in the efforts to settle the 
secessionist conflict. Deeper understanding of the 
complexities of this problem is a key to attaining a viable 
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The continuing struggle of the Moro1 secessionist 
movement in the Philippines is one of Southeast Asia’s 
longest running armed conflicts.2 At the height of the 
conflict, from 1972 to 1976, about 120,000 military and 
civilians lives were lost, another 100,000 civilians fled 
to nearby Malaysia, and around one million inhabitants of 
the southern Philippines were internally displaced.3 The 
conflict persisted for more than four decades and 
threatened the country’s security and territorial 
integrity, and hindered stability and progress in the 
region.  
In the early 1970s, the Muslim Secessionist movement 
under the banner of the Moro National Liberation Front 
(MNLF) led by Nur Misuari, erupted into a major violent 
conflict in Mindanao–southern Philippines (See Figure 1, 
                     
1 The word “Moro” is used interchangeably with “Muslim” to refer to 
ethno-linguistic groups indigenous to Mindanao. However, while “Muslim” 
refers to a universal religious identity, the term Moro denotes a 
political identity distinct from the Islamized peoples of Mindanao and 
Sulu. Moro was originally used in a derogatory way by the Spanish 
colonizers to refer to the peoples of Mindanao, who had the same 
religion as the Moors who had once colonized Spain. See “Glossary of 
Terms,” Website on Muslim Mindanao for Journalists and other 
Communicators, www.muslimmindanao.ph/index.html. 
2 Rizal G. Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed conflict in the 
Philippines, Unresolved National Question or Question of Governance?” 
Asian Journal of Political Science, 1750-7812, Volume 13, no. 1, 2005, 
www.informaworld.com/smpp/ftinterface?content=a789140253&rt=0&format=pd
f (accessed August 16, 2009), 1. 
 3 Benedicto R. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another Opportunity 
to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines,” Special Report, 
United States Institute of Peace, January 2005, 
www.usip.org/resources/mindanao-peace-talks-another-opportunity-
resolve-moro-conflict-philippines (accessed August 28, 2009, 4. 
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Map of the Philippines). The MNLF launched an open armed 
rebellion against the Philippine government to assert 
Muslim self-determination and to demand an independent 
“Bangsamoro”4 state in Mindanao.5   
 
 
Figure 1.   Philippine map. (From: http://mapsof.net/uploads/ 
static-maps/philippines_physical_map.png) 
The historical claim of Mindanao and Sulu as the Moro 
homeland dates to the middle of the 16th century, when 
                     
4 It was MNLF Chairman Nur Misuari who coined this term to refer to 
the identity of the Muslims in Mindanao who would compose the Muslim 
State.  
5 See “MNLF Manifesto” in Danilo Estranero, The Road to Resolving the 
Conflict in the South, (Pasay, Philippines: The Rotary Club of Pasay 
Central, 2007), Appendix–C. 
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Spanish colonizers started to conquer Mindanao.6 Beginning 
at that point, the Muslims carried out a prolonged struggle 
against foreign domination, discrimination, and 
marginalization. The struggle continued until the post-
colonial Philippine administrations that eventually took 
over and governed in Mindanao.   
Scholar Soliman Santos, Jr., argues, “the contemporary 
armed conflict on the Moro front is the sharpest expression 
of the Bangsamoro problem.” It is a product of the 
historical and systematic marginalization and 
minoritization of the Muslims (known as “Moros”) as an 
ethno-linguistic group in their Mindanao homeland, first 
under colonial rule, and later under the Christian-
dominated Philippine governments that followed independence 
in 1946. Moro independence was lost when Mindanao was 
absorbed into the Philippine nation state.7 
Consequently, the Muslims’ identity as the dominant 
and distinct ethno-religious group who ruled over Mindanao 
for centuries deteriorated. Deep-seated Muslim resentments 
and grievances accumulated and exploded into a violent 
armed conflict in the early 1970s. The conflict has evolved 
since then and persists until the present time. 
The Philippine government, since the time of President 
Marcos, has initiated efforts to forge a negotiated 
settlement to the secessionist conflict, after realizing a 
                     
6 Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed conflict in the Philippines,” 2005, 
3. 
7 Soliman M. Santos, Jr., “Evolution of the Armed Conflict in the 
Moro Front,” Human Development Report 2005, Human Development Network 
(HDN), www.muslimmindanao.ph/peace_process.html (accessed October 20, 
2009), 1. 
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military solution to the problem proved futile.8 However, 
further complexities of the conflict prevented the 
Philippine government from attaining its goals.  
Initial government success in peace efforts with the 
MNLF came in late 1976 with the signing of the Tripoli 
Peace Accord, and later the Final Peace Agreement (FPA) in 
1996. The MNLF agreed to accept and settle for autonomy in 
Mindanao. However, the agreement aggravated existing 
leadership differences within the MNLF. Nur Misuari and his 
Vice-Chairman Hashim Salamat differed not only on ideology 
and objectives but also on other aspects as well 
(orientation—secular vs. Islamic; leadership style—
centralized vs. consultative; and ethnic support—Tausug vs. 
Maguindanaon), of which the two top leaders are proponents, 
respectively.9  
An organizational split within the MNLF ensued when 
then-Vice-Chairman Hashim Salamat formed the “New MNLF 
faction,” which in 1984 officially became the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front (MILF). In the 1990s, another group with a 
more extremist perspective emerged from among disgruntled 
MNLF members who formed the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). 
The more Islamic-oriented MILF faction under Salamat 
opposed autonomy as a solution to the Mindanao conflict.  
From the early 1980s until the late 1990s, the MILF assumed 
the secessionist struggle against the government. In 1996, 
                     
8 Salvatore Schiavo-Campo and Mary Judd, “The Mindanao Conflict in 
the Philippines: Roots, Costs, and Potential Peace Dividend,” Social 
Development Papers,(Conflict Prevention & ReconstructionPaper No. 24, 
February 2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCPR/214578-
1111996036679/20482477/WP24_Web.pdf,(accessed August 15, 2009),  2. 
9 Santos, “Evolution of the Armed Conflict in the Moro Front,” 2005, 
4. 
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peace talks began with the GRP-MILF Peace Negotiations in 
Malaysia, but it was not until the GRP-MILF Tripoli 
Agreement of June 22, 2001 that the talks were formalized 
with Malaysia as their official facilitator and host to the 
negotiations.10 The talks have continued since then despite 
the eruption of intermittent armed hostilities between the 
two adversaries. 
In August 2008, a breakthrough in the decade-long 
talks was about to unfold with the scheduled signing of the 
Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD),11 the 
third and most substantial agenda in the talks.  However, 
the Philippine Supreme court ruled as illegal the signing 
of the MOA-AD scheduled for August 5, 2008, in favor of a 
petition filed by Christian political leaders from 
Mindanao.  The petition claimed that the agreement would 
result in the dismemberment of the country and was thus 
unconstitutional.12   
The government further affirmed cancellation of 
signing the final MOA-AD; as a result, the GRP-MILF talks 
became indefinitely stalled. The MILF however, asserted 
that the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain Aspect 
                     
10 Ayesah Abubakar, “KEEPING THE PEACE: The International Monitoring 
Team (IMT) Mission in Mindanao,” SEACSN Publications–Bulletin, 
http://operationspaix.net/IMG/pdf/SEACSN_Publications-Bulletin.pdf 
(accessed September 28, 2009). 
11 The Memorandum of Agreement between the MILF and the GRP consists 
of statements agreed upon by consensus between the peace panels of both 
parties. It deals with Concepts and Principles, Territory, Resources, 
Governance of the Ancestral Domain of the Bangsamoro. See 
http://abpquevedo.blogspot.com/2008/08/what-is-moa-ad-in-milf-grp-
peace.html. 
12 Stella Gonzales, “Secret Pacts Spoil Philippine peace,” Asia Times 
On-Line, August 29, 2008, 
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/JH29Ae01.html (accessed July 15, 
2009). 
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of the 2001 Tripoli Agreement on Peace, having been already 
initialed by the Parties’ representatives to the peace 
negotiations, was a “done deal” and a “living document.”13 
In the middle of this controversy, the Philippine 
government was placed in a dilemma. The MOA-AD issue became 
the focus of various critiques and debates from different 
sectors, particularly Christian political leaders in 
Mindanao and politicians in Manila.  
Meanwhile, violence erupted anew in some parts of 
Mindanao following the non-signing of the MOA-AD. In 
protest, MILF elements went on a rampage and attacked 
Christian villages in the Cotabato and Lanao Provinces. The 
hostilities caused the displacement of 600,000 affected 
civilians out of the 4.2 million newly displaced in 2008, 
as reflected in the Geneva–based International Displacement 
Monitoring center, making Mindanao “the biggest new 
displacement in the world.”14 
Along with these developments, speculations loomed 
that renewed Muslim-Christian violence in Mindanao similar 
to incidents in the early 1970s was imminent. North  
Cotabato Vice-Governor Emmanuel Piñol, a staunch critic of 
                     
13 Taher G. Solaiman, “MOA-AD Documents Another Injustice To Moros,” 
February 26, 2009, 
www.luwaran.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=600:moa-
ad-documents-another-injustice-to-moros&catid=81:moro-
news&itemid=372(accessed July 22, 2009). 
14 Carolyn O. Arguillas, “Eight Years of the GRP-MILF Talks under 
Arroyo: Whatever Happened to ‘All Out Peace’?”, MindaNews, June 23, 
2009, www.mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6558 
(accessed September 28, 2009). 
 7
the MILF, reacted to the recent GRP-MILF truce by declaring 
ing to ANC's15 Dateline Philippines: 
Violence will escalate in Mindanao once the 
military steps back and stops its offensives 
against the separatist Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF)... "Mark my words. I know the 
situation on the ground. I was born here. Mark my 
words. With the suspension of military 
operations, violence will escalate again, if the 
military backs off, Moro commanders, particularly 
Ameril Umbra Kato, Abdullah Macapaar and Aleem 
Pangalian, will attack civilian communities. 
"Logic would dictate the civilians would take up 
arms and defend themselves. There will be a 
resurgence of the Ilaga movement, vigilante 
groups [sic] civilians arming themselves. We 
don't want this to happen," he said.16 
The controversial issue of Ancestral domain and 
renewed hostilities that ensued when this issue is 
exploited can lead to further violence and instability. 
This study explores how this issue of Ancestral domain 
became critical to the prospects of the Muslim secessionist 
conflict settlement, and what key factors have impacted the 
Moro ancestral domain as the significant cause of the 
conflict.  
B. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The purpose of this study is to examine the issues of 
land ownership and migration in relation to the rise of the 
Muslim secessionist conflict in the southern Philippines. 
                     
15 ANC channel is a Rated TV Broadcast station in the Philippines 
that hosts and features talk shows on significant national and 
political issues and events. 
16 Piñol: “Violence to Escalate with MILF-GRP Truce,” abs-
cbnNEWS.com, 07/24/2009, www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/regions/ 
07/24/09/pi%C3%B1ol-violence-escalate-milf grp-truce (accessed 
September 29, 2009). 
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It seeks to answer the question of how land ownership and 
migrant settlement policies impacted the Muslims in 
Mindanao and eventually gave rise to the contemporary 
Muslim secessionist insurgency conflict in the southern 
Philippines, beginning in the early 1970s.  
A number of studies on the Muslim secessionist 
conflict in the southern Philippines were centered 
primarily on aspects of ethnicity, religion, economic 
deprivation, and repression as its causes. This study, 
however, focuses on the impact of land ownership and 
migration in Mindanao as the fundamental cause of the 
Muslim conflict. This study examines how the traditional 
Muslim domination and control of the Moro ancestral domain 
in Mindanao significantly changed over time. It further 
seeks to answer the questions: 1) What factors led to the 
significant changes in the pre-colonial traditional Muslim 
domination and land ownership in Mindanao during the 
colonial and post-colonial periods; 2) How did these 
changes affect the ethnic inhabitants of Mindanao, 
particularly the Muslims; and 3) Why is the Moro ancestral 
domain issue significant in the attainment of a lasting 
settlement of the Muslim secessionist conflict?  
The scope of the study covers the period from the 
colonial to the post-colonial era in the Philippines in 
order to examine migration and land settlement policies, 
and the Muslim struggles. Mindanao and the Muslims during 
the pre-colonial period will provide the background.  
The study highlights the crucial role that migration 
and land settlement played in changing demographic 
composition and Muslim dominance in Mindanao. This resulted 
 9
in the loss of Muslim power and control over territories in 
Mindanao, which ultimately gave rise to the Muslim 
secessionist insurgency in the early 1970s.  
A thorough and deeper understanding of this process 
and the factors that caused the continued Muslim struggle 
is a key to finding a mutually acceptable and lasting 
settlement to the Muslim secessionist problem in the 
southern Philippines.   
C. RELATED LITERATURE 
Following Philippine Independence in 1946, the Muslim 
secessionist conflict in the southern Philippines emerged 
as an ethnic-social conflict largely between the minority 
Muslims and the majority Christians that dominated in 
Mindanao. It evolved from long and the deep-seated Muslim 
resentments and grievances since the time of colonial rule 
that resulted in the minoritization of the Muslims in their 
homeland and dispossessed them of their ancestral land. 
According to Sociologist Louis Kriesberg, conflicts 
can result in either constructive or destructive outcomes, 
depending on the interactions between the contending 
parties during the different stages of the social conflict 
cycle.17  He expanded on the subject and presented some 
important frameworks from which to analyze conflicts. He 
identified the different stages of the social conflict 
cycle: how the conflicts evolved, developed, and ended. 
Using several cases of contemporary major conflicts, he 
further elaborated on the nature, characteristics, and 
                     
17 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to 
Resolution, (Layham, Maryland, United States of America: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), 20-23. 
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bases of conflicts, and conflict strategies. A broader 
understanding of how social conflicts emerge, develop, and  
terminate is a valuable basis and tool for carrying out 
conflict analysis and for determining approaches to 
conflict resolution.  
Looking at the case of the Muslim Secessionist 
conflict in the southern Philippines, the conflict has 
evolved into the de-escalation and negotiation stage of the 
social conflict cycle. The conflicting parties have 
temporarily ceased hostilities and have gone through the 
process of seeking possible negotiated settlement though 
peace talks. This could indicate that with the right 
approach to the issues, the GRP and the MILF are heading in 
the direction of what Kriesberg refers to as “constructive 
conflicts.”18  
Political Science Professor Myrthena L. Fianza, in a 
working paper for the 10th Biennial Conference of the 
International Association for the Study of Common Property, 
points to the fact that the ancestral land issue was a 
major cause for the persistent conflict in Mindanao. She 
argues that: 
the conflict is rooted to the land question 
triggered by the issue of equitable access to 
land and resources or rights to a territory that 
contesting groups view should be acquired or 
reclaimed not solely on the basis of economic 
rights to private property in the western liberal 
sense, or from a more progressive standpoint of 
redistributive reform, but as a determinant of 
                     
18 Louis Kriesberg, Constructive Conflicts: From Escalation to 
Resolution, (Layham, Maryland, United States of America: Rowman & 
Littlefield, 2007), 20-23. 
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the survival of a community and their culture, 
the basis of their identity as a people.19 
Colonial and post-colonial policies on land ownership 
and settlement have discriminated against and marginalized 
the Muslims. They were unjustly dispossessed of their 
ancestral lands in Mindanao, and this caused them to take 
up arms against the government to assert their self-
determination and to preserve their distinct identity. 
Senior Research Associate Astrid Tuminez argues in a 
Special Report that, to prevent or end civil war, minority 
groups must be included as full citizens in a unified 
nation. Using the experiences of other minorities in the 
world (Native Americans in the United States, Maoris in New 
Zealand, Inuit in Canada, and Tamils in Sri Lanka), who 
have lost ancestral and traditional land to a majority- 
governing group, Tuminez points out that the treaties which 
were enforceable in court helped protect the rights of 
these minorities.20 
The Muslim secessionist conflict in the southern 
Philippines is rooted in the loss of ancestral Muslim lands 
in Mindanao and in the domination of Christian settlers. 
Land ownership and ancestral domain are a crucial issue in 
the recent MILF-GRP peace negotiations. The supposed MOA-AD  
 
                     
19 Myrthena L. Fianza, Contesting Land and Identity in the Periphery: 
the Moro Indigenous People of Southern Philippines, as quoted in Ariel 
R. Cacukitan, “Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
in the Southern Philippines,” (Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate 
School, Monterey, CA, December 2005), 5. 
20 Astrid S. Tuminez, “Ancestral Domain in Comparative Perspective,” 
Special Report, United States Institute of Peace, 
www.usip.org/resources/ancestral-domain-comparative-perspective 
(accessed August 2009,) 6-11. 
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between the GRP and MILF could provide a form of an 
enforceable treaty for a viable and mutually acceptable 
solution to the conflict.  
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY  
The study used the qualitative approach and 
descriptive analysis to examine and discuss the facts and 
issues of conditions and events, and to support concepts 
and arguments that answer the selected research questions.  
The study generally relied on available written 
literature from books, articles, and other relevant printed 
publications and documents as its sources. Likewise, online 
resources in the form of scholarly journals, reviews, 
analysis, articles, and reports were explored as additional 
sources of materials for the study. When possible, comments 
and insights from experts or credible persons were used to 
support arguments and explanations presented. 
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
1. Chapter II: Rise and Struggles of the Muslims in 
Mindanao  
This chapter traces the historical background of 
Mindanao, the arrival of Islam, and the rise and formation 
of the early Muslim states (Sultanates). Islam had become 
the main factor that gave the Muslims sense of identity as 
a people apart.21 The sultanates arose as free and sovereign 
states to dominate and rule over the Islands of Mindanao 
and Sulu for centuries prior to the arrival of the 
                     
21 Melvin Mednick, “Some Probems of Moro History and Political 
Organization,” in The Muslim Filipinos, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert 
D. McAmis,(Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 11. 
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colonizers. During this period, the Muslim concept of land 
ownership was anchored in traditional and customary law.  
The chapter then describes and discusses the coming of 
colonial rule and the colonizers’ efforts to control the 
Muslims, which were met by strong Muslim resistance. It 
also examines the struggles against foreign domination, 
marginalization, and exploitation that continued up to the 
post-colonial Philippine administrations. Lastly, it 
relates the consequence of these long periods of struggles 
to the contemporary Muslim struggles that ultimately led to 
the outbreak of the secessionist conflict in the early 
1970s. 
2. Chapter III: Land Ownership and Migration in 
Mindanao  
This chapter looks at the land ownership and 
settlement policies in Mindanao implemented during the 
colonial and post-colonial periods. It analyzes how these 
policies impacted Muslim domination and control in Mindanao 
as a distinct ethno-religious group. These policies 
discriminated against and marginalized Muslims as they lost 
land ownership to non-Muslim settlers, and eventually led 
to Christian dominance in Mindanao. Consequently, land 
disputes between Muslims and the descendants of Christian 
settlers in the 1960s and the early 1970s became a 
significant element in the major violent Muslim conflict 
that erupted. 
3. Chapter IV: Muslim Secessionist Insurgency  
This chapter covers the rise of the contemporary 
Muslim secessionist insurgency in the 1970s. It discusses 
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the evolution of secessionist movements and the escalation 
of the conflict into an armed rebellion against the 
Philippine government. It then discusses how government 
responded in order to address and resolve the conflict.  
4. Chapter V: Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter presents an overall summary and 
conclusions regarding the impact on and implications of 
land ownership and settlement in the Moro ancestral domain 
as a significant driving factor behind the Muslim conflict, 
and how this has become a central issue in the peaceful 
settlement of the conflict. This chapter concludes by 
considering how Moro ancestral domain became significant to 
the success of the peace talks and the attainment of a 
lasting peace that could put an end to the Muslim 
secessionist conflict.  
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II. RISE AND STRUGGLES OF THE MUSLIMS IN MINDANAO 
A. CONTEMPORARY MUSLIMS IN MINDANAO     
Mindanao and Sulu Islands (Mindanao), the southernmost 
islands of the Philippine archipelago, is the second 
largest among the three major Island groups: Luzon, 
Visayas, and Mindanao (see Figure 1, Map of the 
Philippines). It is home to the country’s largest 
concentration of Muslims, who make up about five percent of 
the Philippines’ population of 87.9 million, and 20 percent 
of Mindanao’s 16 million.  
For many Filipinos, Mindanao is seen as a frontier and 
a land of promise; it reflects contrasting images of bounty 
and want, of war and peace, and of rapid development amid 
the increasing impoverishment of its people.22  Mindanao’s 
geographic location in the East Asian region and its rich 
natural resources make the area a potential and strategic 
trans-shipment point and center of trade in the region.23 
(See Figure 2, Map of Southeast Asia.) 
 
                     
22 Macapado A. Muslim and Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, Mindanao: Land of 
Promise (April 1999), www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/philippines-
mindanao/promised-land.php# (accessed July 27, 2009) 
23 Danilo E Estranero. The Road to Resolving the Conflict in the 
South. (Pasay, Philippines: The Rotary Club of Pasay Central, 2007), 4. 
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Figure 2.   Map of Southeast Asia (From www.international 
studies.ohio.edu) 
The Islamized people of today’s Mindanao are the most 
dominant ethnic group in the Philippines.24  They include at 
least thirteen different ethno-linguistic groups. The three 
largest and most politically dominant are 1) The 
Maguindanaons, “people of the flooded plains,” of the 
Cotabato Province (Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, North 
Cotabato, and South Cotabato); 2) The Maranaos, “people of 
                     
24 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, Mindinao: Land of Promise, 1999. 
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the lake,” of the two Lanao Provinces; and 3) The Tausugs, 
“people of the current,” of the Sulu Archipelago. The 
Yakan, Sama, Badjaw, Kalagan, Sangil, Iranun or Ilanun, 
Palawani, Melebugnon, Kalibogan, and Jama Mapun compose the 
other minority groups. Further included are Muslim converts 
from the other ethno-linguistic groups in the country.25  
Records of the Bureau of Muslim Settlements show the 
population of the different Muslim ethno-linguistic groups 
in Mindanao as of the year 2004.26 (See Table 1, Muslim 
Ethno-Linguistic Groups in Mindanao.) 
Table 1.   Muslim Ethno-Liguistic Groups (From Estranero, 








                     
25 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, Mindinao: Land of Promise, 1999. 







Figure 3.   Mindanao Map. (From Eric Gutierez and Saturnino 
Borras, “The Moro Conflict: Landlessness and 
Misdirected State Policies,” East-West Center, 
Washington, DC www.eastwestcenterwashington.org/ 
Publications/publications.htm.) 
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B. MINDANAO IN THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD (PRIOR TO 1565) 
1. Ethnic Inhabitants and the Coming of Islam 
During the pre-colonial period, Mindanao and the Sulu 
archipelago was a place inhabited by various ethno-
linguistic groups of indigenous people who had settled in 
the islands beginning in the early migration period. The 
islands existed as a separate territory that developed its 
own distinct culture and identity.27 The region thrived in 
communities that established contacts and developed 
relationships with people from the outside world.  
Islam came to the Philippines through in international 
trade, principally dominated by Arab Muslims, which during 
the 9th century extended from Morocco to China.28 The 
strategic geographic location of the Sulu archipelago in 
the southernmost part of Mindanao provides with the 
neighboring states provided a vital trade route for early 
Malay and Arab traders. From the 9th to the 11th centuries, 
Arab traders were the first to reach Mindanao through the 
Red Sea-Indian Ocean-South China Sea trade route.29 By the 
middle of the 13th century, international trade and 
commerce were flourishing in the Sulu islands.  
 
 
                     
27 Wikipedia contributors, "Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao," 
Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Autonomous_Region_in_Muslim_M
indanao&oldid=314480489 (accessed October 21, 2009). 
28 Cesar A. Majul, “The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical 
Perspectives,” in The Muslim Filipinos, ed. Peter G. Gowing and Robert 
D. McAmis, (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 3. 
29 Allan R. Luga, “Muslim Insurgency in Mindanao, Philippines” 
(Master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2002), 
13. 
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Through early Arab traders and Islamic missionaries, Islam 
greatly influenced the lives of region’s indigenous 
inhabitants.  
2. Islamization and the Rise of the Sultanates  
The flow of trade and commerce along the Sulu trade 
route from the ninth to the 13th centuries brought not only 
an influx of Muslim traders, but also of Arab missionaries 
and Islamic teachers. During the period from the 10th to 
the 13th centuries, Islam was introduced to the ethnic 
inhabitants as a religion and a way of life.30 Malay traders 
and religious figures had established Muslim settlements in 
Sulu by the last quarter of the 13th century and by the 
middle of the 15th century, Islamic political institutions 
had become prominent.31 As Rizal Buendia underlines, long 
before the coming of the Western colonizers, Mindanao and 
Sulu were places of flourishing Islamic communities and 
settlements under the sultanates that had been established 
and that provided a system of rules and governance.32 This 
point in history saw the initiation of the early 
Islamization process of the indigenous inhabitants in 
Mindanao. 
                     
30 Estranero, The Road to Resolving the Conflict in the South, 2007, 
4. 
31 Lawrence Cline (2000), “The Islamic Insurgency in the 
Philippines,” Small Wars & Insurgencies, 11:3, 115-138, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592310008423291 (accessed September 21, 
2009), (note 10), 116. 
32 Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed conflict in the Philippines,” 2005, 
3. 
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Islam gained prominence and quickly spread out across 
the Sulu Islands, converting the inhabitants (Tausugs)33 
into Muslims. By 1450, an Islamic form of government 
emerged in Sulu when Abu Bakr, an Arab leader, established 
the first Muslim sultanate in Mindanao, the Sultanate of 
Sulu.34 Subsequently, Islam expanded to the Mindanao 
mainland. About a century later, Serif Kabungsuan came with 
his men from Johore (now Malaysia), arrived in mainland 
Mindanao, and introduced Islam. They successfully converted 
the native inhabitants to Islam and later the Sultanate of 
Maguindanao was established, with Seriff Kabungsuan as the 
first Sultan of Mindanao.35 Islamic missionary efforts in 
the 15th and 16th centuries also established sultanates in 
the Lanao and Cotabato areas. By the end of the 15th 
century, Islam had spread northwards where Muslim Rajas 
(Rajah Sulaiman Mahmud, Rajah Matanda, and Rajah Lakandula) 
ruled over what is now Manila.36  
3. Rise of the Early Muslim States in Mindanao 
The early Muslim sultanates in Mindanao and Sulu arose 
as part of the Islamized Malay world and became the most 
developed and cohesive political system among the 
                     
33 The Tausugs are a group referred to as the “people of the 
current,” who are dominant among ethnic Muslim groups inhabiting the 
Sulu Islands. 
34 Federico V. Magdalena, Islam and the Politics of Identity: Lessons 
from the Philippines and Southeast Asia, Center for Philippine Studies, 
University of Hawai’i at Manoa, N.D, 
http://www.hawaii.edu/cps/identity.html (accessed on August 26, 2009). 
35 Teodoro A. Agoncillo and Oscar M. Alfonso, History of the Filipino 
People, (Quezon City, Philippines: Malaya Books, 1967), 26. 
36 Orlando B. Quevedo, “Injustice: The Root of Conflict in Mindanao,” 
www.cpn.nd.edu/Injustice % 20 article.doc (accessed August 28, 2009).  
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inhabitants of the Islands at that time.37 The Tausugs and 
Maguindanaons dominated early state formations in the 
Philippines. The sultanates of Sulu and Maguindanao They 
existed as sovereign and independent states and thus became 
centers of resistance against the foreign colonial rulers.38 
The sultanates prior to the coming of colonizers had 
already established the requisites of nationhood: a 
territory, people, government, and sovereignty.39 During 
this period, Muslim political organization under the 
Islamic sultans and datus was relatively more advanced than 
in the other parts of the Philippines.40 The sultanates, as 
Macapando Muslim argues, “provided Mindanao Muslims with an 
identity as peoples distinct from the inhabitants of Luzon 
and the Visayas.” Islam had become the Muslims’ basis of 
their defiance against foreign domination.41   
This era highlights the rise and development of Muslim 
state formation (the Sultanates) in the early Philippines, 
and highlights the glorious years of Islamic rule and 
domination. During this period, the Moros were the 
unconquered people of the south and the masters of Mindanao 
                     
37 Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, “The Muslim Introduction: 
Irresistible Forces, Immovable Objects” in The Muslim Filipinos ed. 
Peter G. Gowing and Robert D. McAmis, (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing 
House, 1974), ix. 
38 Astrid S. Tuminez, “This Land is Our Land: Moro Ancestral Domain 
and its Implications for Peace and Development in the Southern 
Philippines,” SAIS Review, Volume 27, no. 2, Summer-Fall 2007, 77-91, 
muse.jhu.edu/login?uri=/journals/sais_review/v027/27.2tuminez.html 
(accessed August 18, 2009). 
39 Solaiman Santos, “Evolution of the Armed Conflict in the Moro 
Front,” Human Development Network Foundation, Inc. for the Philippine 
Human Development Report 2005, 67. 
40 Cline, Lawrence. “The Islamic Insurgency in the Philippines,” 
2000, (note 14) 117. 
41 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, Mindinao: Land of Promise, 1999. 
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and Sulu, where they constituted 98 percent of the 
population.42 The political influence of the sultanates 
extended to what is known today as Brunei, as well as the 
provinces of Cebu, Panay, Mindoro, and Ilocos.43  
C. SPANISH COLONIAL PERIOD (1565-1898) 
Spanish colonization first came to the Philippines in 
1565, motivated by trade and in search of spices.44  They 
named the archipelago “Philippines,” after Prince Philip 
II, the future King of Spain, and established permanent 
settlements in the Visayas and Luzon. The Spanish 
colonizers easily conquered except in Mindanao, where they 
met strong Muslim resistance. The conquered local 
inhabitants were then Christianized and subjugated under 
Spanish colonial rule.  
The first site of Moro-Spanish confrontation was not 
in Mindanao, but in the Muslim settlements in today’s 
Manila ruled jointly by Raja Sulaiman Mahmud and Rajah 
Matanda, and in Tondo by Raja Lakandula.45 Manila served as 
the main trading port in Luzon under the Muslim control. 
The conquerors successfully defeated the Muslims who were 
                     
42 Benedicto R. Bacani, “The Mindanao Peace Talks: Another 
Opportunity to Resolve the Moro Conflict in the Philippines,” Special 
Report, United States Institute of Peace, January 2005, 
www.usip.org/resources/mindanao-peace-talks-another-opportunity-
resolve-moro-conflict-philippines (accessed August 28, 2009). 
43 Lualhati M. Abreau, “Colonialism and Resistance: A Historical 
Perspective,” in The Moro Reader: History of Contemporary Struggle of 
the Baangsamoro People, ed. Bobby M. Tuazon, (Policy Study Publication 
and Advocacy, Center for People Empowerment in Government, 2008), 18.   
44 Federico V. Magdalena, “Islam and the Politics of Identity: 
Lessons from the Philippines and Southeast Asia,” Center for Philippine 
Studies, University of Hawai’i at Manoa (ND), 
www.hawaii.edu/cps/identity.html, (accessed on August 26, 2009) 
45 Salah Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, (Lahore, Pakistan: 
Islamic Research Academy, Second Edition, October 1997), 25. 
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forced to dissolve their settlements and withdraw to their 
strongholds in Mindanao. This first battle in Manila marked 
the beginning of the long Moro-Spanish Wars to colonize 
Mindanao.46 The onset of Spanish colonization had 
effectively blocked the spread of Islam and had prevented 
the growth of Muslim influence from expanding to other 
parts of the Philippines.47 
By 1578, Spanish attempts to conquer Islam were 
launched with attacks in Sulu and Borneo. This began the 
so-called Moro-Spanish Wars, a bitter war of attrition that 
lasted for more than three centuries.48 The Spanish conquest 
used Christianized Filipinos as tools in a series of 
military campaigns against the Muslims. This impacted what 
the Filipino Muslim is today, and defined his attitudes and 
relations to all non-Muslim foreigners or Filipinos.49  
In defiance of the perceived threat of colonial rule 
to Muslim dominance, colonial conquests in Mindanao were 
met with strong resistance. Muslims launched pre-emptive 
counter-attacks using fierce coastal raids against Spanish 
settlements in Luzon and Visayas. These raids brought much 
fear and terror to the Christianized Filipinos and their 
colonial masters, and as a result the Moros were branded as 
savage sea-raiding pirates and bandits.50  
                     
46 Salah Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, (Lahore, Pakistan: 
Islamic Research Academy, Second Edition, October 1997), 25. 
47 Estranero, The Road to Resolving the Conflict in the South, 2007, 
11. 
48 Magdalena, “Islam and the Politics of Identity.” 
49 Cesar A. Majul, “The Muslims in the Philippines: An Historical 
Perspective,” in The Muslim Filipinos, ed. Peter Gowing and Robert D. 
McAmis, (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1974), 7. 
50 Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 1997, 29. 
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Spanish efforts to extend their influence, despite 
establishing footholds in the northern and eastern Mindanao 
and the Zamboanga peninsula, failed to colonize the rest of 
Mindanao.51 The conquests, however, had further sowed the 
seeds of Muslim-Christian animosity.52 Cesar Majul describes 
the adverse consequences of the Spanish conquest: 
Spanish rule brought with it the disruption of 
time–honoured Muslim maritime commercial 
activities; the systematic destruction of Muslim 
settlements, farms, and orchards; depopulation 
caused by famine, disease and Spanish military 
expeditions; and isolation from neighboring 
Muslim Malays who had fallen under the British 
and Dutch imperialism. Together these were to 
spell the eventual loss of independence for the 
sultanates.53 
Further, the Spanish conquest started a process that 
eventually reshaped the demographic composition of Mindanao 
by depriving the indigenous inhabitants of their land, and 
by creating deep-seated prejudices among the different 
ethno-linguistic groups.54  
D. AMERICAN COLONIAL PERIOD (1898-1946) 
American colonial policies in Mindanao during the 
early 20th century planted additional seeds of future 
                     
51 Muslim and Cagoco-Guiam, Mindinao: Land of Promise, 1999. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Cesar Adib Majul, “The Moro Struggle in the Philippines,” Third 
World Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 2, Islam & Politics (April, 1988), Taylor 
& Francis, Ltd., from www.jstor.org/stable/3992672 (accessed July 28, 
2009), 897. 
54 Ibid., 887. 
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conflict between the minoritized Filipino Muslims (Moros) 
and the Philippine government in this region.55  
The Philippines were ceded to the United States by 
virtue of the Treaty of Paris, signed in December, 1898, 
following the defeat of Spain in the Spanish-American War. 
Mindanao and Sulu, although never fully under Spanish 
control, were included in the treaty.56 This carried the 
Muslim struggle to another episode, against a new colonial 
ruler, for the next four decades.  
As they had done with the Spanish colonizers, the 
Muslims opposed the arrival of the Americans in Mindanao in 
1899 and rejected the new colonial rule. Nevertheless, 
Jubair notes that the Americans had prepared a 
comprehensive plan for dealing with the Moros before they 
set foot in Mindanao. The plan involved a strategy 
incorporating military, political, social, economic, and 
educational components.57  
Despite Muslim resistance, the American colonial 
authorities effectively pacified and gained control over 
the Muslims in Mindanao though various policies as part of 
their strategy. Following President William McKinley’s 
                     
55 G. Eugene Martin and Astrid S. Tuminez, Toward Peace in the 
Southern Philippines, A Summary and Assessment of the USIP Philippine 
Facilitation Project, 2003–2007, 
www.ciaonet.org/wps/usip10683/usip10683.pdf (accessed September 15, 
2009), (note 1), 2. 
56 Susan D. Russell and others, “The Mindanao Conflict and Prospects 
for Peace in the Southern Philippines,” from Mindanao: A Perspective on 
Youth, Inter-Ethnic Dialogue and Conflict Resolution In the Southern 
Philippines, Center for Southeast Asian Studies and Office of 
International Training, Northern Illinois University, 2004, 
www.cseas.niu.edu/outreach/MindanaoPeace.pdf (accessed on August 28, 
2009). 
57 Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 1997, 47. 
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pronouncement that “the islands were not ours to exploit, 
but to develop, to civilize, to educate, and to train in 
the science of self-government,”58 a more liberal policy of 
“non-interference” was initially adopted in dealing with 
the Moros, especially on issues affecting Muslim religious 
practices. At this point, the concern was to gain Muslim 
acknowledgement of United States sovereignty in Mindanao 
and Sulu to prevent the eventual tactical alliance between 
the Filipino revolutionaries and the Moro warriors, which 
would be too difficult to handle.59   
Immediately in August, 1899, the “Kiram-Bates Treaty” 
between Brigadier Gen. John C. Bates of the U.S. Army and 
Sultan Jamalul Kiram II of Sulu was drawn up. The treaty 
provides, among other conditions, that, “...the Americans 
gave due recognition to the Moro religion, customs, and 
traditions.”60 Under this policy, similar arrangements 
between the Americans and Muslims in other parts of 
Mindanao were also agreed on.  
Subsequently, the American policies shifted to attain 
greater control over the Muslims. Most of these policies 
countered the traditional Muslim customs and practices, 
which created strong opposition among Muslims.  
To address the growing incidence of Muslim violence 
and resistance, the Americans carried out “Pacification 
Campaigns” from 1902 to 1913. This period became the so-
                     
58 Estranero, The Road to Resolving the Conflict in the South, 2007, 
15. 
59 Ricardo David, “The Causes and Prospect of The Southern 
Philippines Secessionist Movement,” (Master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, December 2003), 42. 
60 Quevedo, “Injustice: The Root of Conflict in Mindanao.” 
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called “Moro-American Wars,” which started in March, 1902, 
with the first major American-Moro military confrontation 
in Southern Lanao.61  As hostilities developed, the policies 
of “Direct Rule” and “Scorched Earth” were adopted to 
suppress Muslim unrest and resistance.62 
Having the superior force advantage, the Americans 
easily defeated the Muslims, but not after a series of 
fierce campaigns that took hundreds of Muslim lives. The 
battles of “Bud Dajo” and “Bud Bagsak” in Sulu, in 1906 and 
1913, respectively, that resulted in hundreds of Muslim 
men, women, and children killed63 underscored the brutality 
of the campaigns and Muslims’ stubborn resistance to 
foreign domination. Between 1903 and 1906, American troops 
killed some 3,000 Muslims during their pacification 
campaigns.64 
By 1913, the pacification campaigns resulted in the 
Americans gaining effective control over Mindanao and 
initiated a series of transitions in the Administration of 
the Muslims. The Moro Province was transferred from 
military rule to the American civil authorities under the 
Department of Mindanao and Sulu, then later to the 
Christianized Filipinos.65   
                     
61 Luga, “Muslim Insurgency,” 2002, 22. 
62 Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 1997, 49-55. 
63 In the Bud Dajo massacre of 1906 in Sulu, U.S. soldiers killed 600 
Tausug men, women, and children who rebelled against the imposition of 
a local head tax. Gowing, Peter Gordon. Mandate in Moroland: The U.S. 
Government of Muslim Filipinos, 1899–1920. (Quezon City, Philippines: 
New Day Publishers, 1983), 164. 
64 Marco Garrido, “The Evolution of the Philippine Muslim Insurgency, 
Southeast Asia,” www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/EC06Ae03.html 
(accessed August 7. 2009). 
65 Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 1997, 51-52 
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The next period saw American efforts to assimilate the 
Muslims in order to consolidate their control of the 
Philippines. To assimilate the Muslims in Mindanao, several 
reforms in local administration and educational system were 
introduced. The Muslims, however, viewed this, especially 
the new education system, as a way to subjugate their way 
of life and religion, and thus responded negatively.66   
As part of their assimilation process, the Americans 
introduced Christian settlers in Mindanao purposely to help 
enhance productivity among Muslim farmers, to expose them 
to Christian institutions, and to reduce their isolation. 
However, this policy facilitated an influx of migrant 
settlers that sparked Muslim-Christian conflicts.67 A 
further series of land ownership policies were increasingly 
biased against the Muslims. 
Beginning in the 1920s, Muslim leaders in Mindanao and 
Sulu initiated a peaceful movement that asserted their 
right to establish their own nation-state and to form a 
government of their choice. Leaders petitioned and offered 
two options for the U.S Congress to consider: join the 
Federal Government of the United States, or be declared a 
separate sovereign state from the would-be Philippine 
republic.68 Unfortunately, this expression of Muslim 
sentiment was never given due consideration and attention. 
In preparation for the formation of the Philippine 
Commonwealth Government in 1935, as a transition for the 
                     
66 Majul, “The Moro Struggle in the Philippines,” 1988, 889. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Buendia, “The State-Moro Armed conflict in the Philippines,” 2005, 
7. 
 30
eventual U.S granting of Philippine independence, the 
administration of Mindanao was left to the overall control 
and responsibility of the Filipino authorities.69 
Ironically, this placed the Muslims at the mercy of their 
long-time local enemies, those very people that they had 
dominated during the pre-colonial period. 
E. COMMONWEALTH PERIOD (1935-1946) 
Commonwealth government policies anchored on Western 
influence continued to marginalize and alienate the Muslims 
from their traditional laws and practices under the 
sultanates. The enactment of the “Quirino-Recto 
Colonization Act” in 1935, which declared settlement the 
“only lasting solution to the problem in Mindanao and 
Sulu,” became the turning point of the land settlement 
issue that continued to marginalize the Muslims. This law 
opened the floodgates to a massive influx of settlers who 
were aided by development support from the government.70  
This was the initial stage of changing the demographic 
composition of Mindanao from dominantly inhabited and 
controlled by the Muslims, into being dominated by the 
migrant Christian Filipinos.  
F. POST-COLONIAL PERIOD (1946–ONWARDS) 
Another episode in the continuing Muslim struggle 
against domination, discrimination, and exploitation is the 
rise in 1946 of the Philippine Republic at the end of 
                     
69 Estranero, The Road to Resolving the Conflict in the South, 2007, 
18. 
70 Bertrand, cited in Ricardo David, “The Causes And Prospect Of The 
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American colonial rule. Despite earlier objections to the 
inclusion of Mindanao in Philippine Independence under the 
Christianized Filipinos, the Muslims became members of the 
Republic without their consent and against their will.71 
Hence, Moros did not consider themselves part of the 
new Philippine Republic. The differences in religion, 
beliefs, and practices, as well as existing animosities 
against the Christians, made it impossible for the Muslims 
to live harmoniously with the Christianized Filipinos under 
one rule. The Muslims were mostly illiterate and were 
treated as second-class citizens. The post-colonial 
Philippine state included the Muslims in the politics of 
self-rule, but the Christian-dominated government continued 
to marginalize the Muslims.72  
Continued government-sponsored non-Muslim migration 
and resettlement created further misunderstandings, 
resentments, and grievances. The “Homestead Program” during 
President Ramon Magsaysay’s administration in the 1950s 
brought former communist rebels from Luzon to settle in 
Mindanao. This created an impression of Mindanao as a 
dumping ground for undesirables in Luzon, and was an 
additional instance of discrimination against the Muslims. 
Over a period of about six decades, from 1913 to 1970, 
Muslims were transformed into a minority on a territory 
they had dominated for centuries in every arena: political, 
demographic, and landowning.73 Through the 1960s and 1970s, 
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Muslim-Christian relations continued to deteriorate, with 
increasing hostilities and violence. The Jabidah Massacre74 
in 1968 further heightened the Muslims’ grievances against 
the Philippine government. This incident and an emerging  
Islamic consciousness among Muslim youths and students 
triggered the formation of the Muslim secessionist 
movements. By the early 1970s, Muslim-Christian land 
disputes in mainland Mindanao worsened and created a 
situation ripe for further hostilities that was about to 
erupt into a major armed conflict. 
                     
74 The Jabidah Massacre of March 18, 1968 involves the alleged mass 
killings of young Muslim recruits by their Philippine military 
trainers. According to the allegations, the killings were part of a 
plan by then-President Marcos to regain Sabah from Malaysia by force. 
(See Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny), 108-109.  
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III. LAND OWNERSHIP AND MIGRATION IN MINDANAO 
This chapter examines the impact of land ownership and 
migration during the colonial and post-colonial periods in 
Mindanao. Under colonial rule, Muslims were subjected to 
new land laws and the settlement policies for migrant 
settlers from the north. Colonial rule began a process that 
was to alter Mindanao’s demographic composition. It 
deprived the indigenous inhabitants of their land and 
spawned deep-seated prejudices among the different ethno-
linguistic groups.75 Before colonization, the Muslims 
controlled about 98 percent of the lands in Mindanao and 
Sulu.76 Colonial land laws and settlement policies continued 
during the post-colonial Philippine Republic, and were 
factors that caused the Mindanao conflict.77   
A. TRADITIONAL MUSLIM CONCEPTS OF LAND OWNERSHIP 
The early Muslim concept of land ownership is based on 
traditional law or “adat,” a local term among the Moros. 
This law adheres to the notion that there can be no 
absolute ownership of land, and that land and indeed all 
creation, according to the principles of Islam, belongs to 
God who entrusted it to man for his stewardship. As Cagoco-
Guiam notes, this principle was the practice among Muslims 
prior to the colonial era; land ownership was based on 
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usufructory rights, with the Sultans and the Datus assuming 
the supreme stewardship of the lands and territories.78 
For the Muslims, the concept of land-holding was based 
on the right to the produce of the land. For centuries, 
even before the sultanates, communal ownership was the main 
concept of Muslim land ownership. However, this was altered 
when colonization brought with it the Western concept of 
land ownership, which is entirely unlike Muslim customary 
law. With the Muslims subjected under colonial rule, the 
change in Muslim land ownership in Mindanao began. 
B. COLONIAL CONCEPT OF LAND OWNERSHIP 
Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines (1565–1898), 
introduced the Western concept of land ownership based on 
the Regalian doctrine.79 By virtue of conquest, the Spanish 
state became the sole owner of “state domain,” including 
lands, forests, bodies of water, and natural resources.80 
The consequent effects of this doctrine on the traditional 
Muslim concept of land ownership are examined by Tuminez:  
                     
78 Rufa Cagoco-Guiam, “Retrospect and Prospects: Toward a Peaceful 
Mindanao,” KASAMA Vol. 10 no. 3, July / August / September 1996, 
Solidarity Philippines Australia Network, 
http://cpcabrisbane.org/Kasama/1996/V10n3/Retrospect.htm (accessed 26 
October 26, 2009). 
79 A feudal theory known as Jura Regalia–which later became the 
infamous Regalian Doctrine–was introduced into the Phillipines through 
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas.  The Jura Regalia did not 
automatically mean absolute ownership of the Philippine islands; 
however, the colonists justified their appropriation of the islands 
through this legal fiction, which stated that, “henceforth, by virtue 
of conquest, all lands in the archipelago belonged to the sovereign.”  
This became and has since remained the theoretical bedrock upon which 
Philippine land laws were based and which dealt a fatal blow to 
Philippine indigenous concepts of land rights and land tenure.  See 
Molintas, (note 41) 290. 
80 Tuminez, “This Land is Our Land,” 2007. 
 35
The Regalian doctrine contradicted and nullified 
the Moro tradition of communal land ownership, 
under which clan chiefs, or datus, ruled over and 
disposed of land considered to be under their 
jurisdiction. It removed free communal access to 
water, forests, land and other natural resources 
that were sources of local peoples’ daily 
sustenance. It nullified the domain of the 
sultanates and invalidated the prior occupancy 
rights of Moros and other indigenous peoples.81 
Muslims were not initially affected, as Spain never 
fully conquered Mindanao. Mindanao and the Sulu Islands, 
unlike the Visayas and Luzon, were excluded from the 
encomienda system and other Spanish land tenure 
arrangements. The Regalian Doctrine’s effect on the Muslims 
was felt later, during American colonial rule.82 
Neither the existence of Muslim ancestral domains nor 
the legitimacy of the sultanates was recognized when the 
Philippines were ceded to the United States. Under the new 
colonial government, the Regalian doctrine found a place in 
the state legal system as the basis for all public land 
laws imposed on the Filipinos.83 The American colonizers 
adopted the same policy of requiring settlers on public 
lands to obtain deeds from the government, which 
demonstrated their recognition of the Regalian doctrine as 
a legal basis for the state to hold property.84 
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To enhance colonial control in the country, the 
Philippine Commission enacted several laws especially 
focused on land ownership and settlements. As these laws 
and policies were enforced in Mindanao, the Muslims began 
to lose their lands.  
C. DISCRIMINATORY COLONIAL LAND LAWS AND POLICIES  
The American colonial government introduced laws to 
reinforce the state’s control over the public domain under 
the pretext that Spanish rule had failed to implement an 
effective system of land registration.85 The land laws 
implemented during American rule, however, encroached into 
the dominion of the sultanates in the Islamized areas of 
Mindanao and Sulu, and consequently made the Moros and the 
other indigenous groups in Mindanao "resident strangers."86  
1. Land Registration Act No. 496 of 1902 
The Land Registration Act of 1902 was the first law 
enacted under the American colonial government. It declared 
all lands subject to the Torrens system87 of formal 
registration of land title, and empowered the State to 
issue to any legitimate claimant secure proof of title over 
a parcel of land.88 According to Molintas, the Torrens 
System transformed land into a commodity that could be 
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traded by the simple exchange of a piece of paper.89  This 
law restricted land registration only to individuals and 
corporations who had money and in turn excluded communities 
and clans, which under Muslim customary laws were the 
trustees of lands. 
The law on land registration contradicted the 
traditional Muslim concept of land ownership based 
customary law, or “adat.”  Unaware of the consequences of 
the new system, many of the natives (Muslims) refused or 
did not bother to register the lands they were cultivating. 
Nevertheless, several Moro datus and traditional Muslim 
elites took advantage of this law to registere the vast 
sultanate- or datu-controlled lands in their names. These 
datus thus became the ancestors of the contemporary land-
wealthy Moro elite families.90 
The Land Registration system discriminated against the 
Muslims who mostly lacked the required level of literacy, 
financial means, and awareness of legal administrative 
procedures to comply with the law.91 Due to widespread 
hostilities in the islands during that early period of 
American colonial rule, Muslims were reluctant to follow 
the new foreign rules that had been imposed on them.92  Such 
was the biased and unfair treatment of the Muslims and 
indigenous peoples, who only understood ancestral and 
communal land ownership.  
                     
89 Molintas, “The Philippine Indigenous Peoples’ Struggle,” 291. 
90 Cagoco-Guiam, Retrospect and Prospects, 1996. 
91 Tuminez, “This Land is Our Land,” 2007, 79. 
92 Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 1997, 75-76 
 38
As was to be expected, large private holdings became 
the primary beneficiaries of almost all titles granted 
under the Land Registration Act of 1902. Records in 1912 
listed 159 major plantations (100 hectares or more) in 
Mindanao, 66 of them owned by Americans, 39 by Filipinos 
(mostly Christians), 27 by Europeans, and 27 by Chinese. 
This has impoverished the Moros and indigenous people of 
Mindanao to the point that they had become “squatters in 
their own land.”93 
2. Public Land Act No. 496 and the Philippine Bill 
of 1902  
In the same year, Public Land Act No. 496 was passed 
as a corollary to the Land Registration Act of 1902. This 
law mandated the conversion of all those lands unregistered 
in the previous year, to automatically become public lands. 
As public lands, they could then be sold to Filipinos, 
Americans, and others regardless of nationality. It was 
under this law that the homestead system was introduced in 
Mindanao.94  
The Philippine Bill of 1902, on the other hand, 
provided the specific conditions of the disposition of 
public lands and set the limits on hectarage that 
individuals and corporations could acquire. The provisions 
of this bill were prejudicial to individuals, as they could 
only own up to 16 hectares, while corporations could own up 
to 1,604 hectares.95 
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3. The Philippine Commission Act No. 718 of 1903 
In 1903, the Philippine Commission Act No. 718 was 
enacted. This law voided all land grants from Moro Sultans 
or Datus or from chiefs of other indigenous Tribes made 
without the authority or consent of the government.96  This 
contradicted the traditional Muslim system of land 
ownership. The law further mandated that all unregistered 
lands become part of the public domain, and that only the 
State had the authority to classify or exploit the same.97  
Essentially, this act removed the authority of the 
traditional Sultans and Datus, or chiefs, to dispose of 
land to their subjects, and disregarded the customary 
Muslim land laws. The Act further dispossessed the Moros of 
their landholdings, which, in most instances, they had held 
since the pre-colonial period.98 
4. The Public Act 926 of 1903 
Another law enacted in 1903 provided, among other 
stipulations, that all lands not registered under Act No. 
496 (Land Registration Act) were deemed public lands, and 
therefore open for homestead, sale, or lease by individual 
or corporation. Under this law, individuals were entitled 
to acquire homesteads of not more than 16 hectares and 
corporations up to 1,024 hectares.99 This law was amended in 
1919 to allow Christians to own up to 24 hectares, while 
only ten hectares were permitted for Muslims. In 1936, this 
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law was further amended to reduce the number of hectares to 
16 for Christians, but only four for Muslims.100  
The disparities in the provisions of these colonial 
laws indicated the level of discrimination against the 
Muslim inhabitants of Mindanao in favor of the non-Muslim 
settlers. They also provided a good cover for the 
systematic dispossession of Moro landholdings due to the 
Muslims’ ignorance, reluctance, or resistance to comply.101   
Besides being obviously biased and discriminatory 
colonial land laws, the implementation of government and 
corporate development projects significantly contributed to 
the dislocation of the Muslims from the lands they had held 
for centuries. Tuminez describes the overall effect of this 
process as “‘land-grabbing by legal means’ and the massive 
land disenfranchisement of Moros and other indigenous 
groups.” 102   
5. The Mining Law of 1905 
The Mining Law, enacted in 1905, declared that all 
public lands were free, open for exploration, occupation, 
and purchase, and further confiscated Muslim lands. It 
opened Mindanao to foreign nationals and corporations, 
particularly those owned by Americans, to take advantage of 
vast unexplored areas of land.103 This law led not only to 
the exploitation of the natural resources of Mindanao by 
foreign corporations, but in the long run, the dislocation 
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of the native inhabitants who were dislocated and 
dispossessed of their lands and source of living.  
6. The Cadastral Act of 1907 
This act, which introduced additional technical 
procedures in the acquisition of land ownership, led to 
further loss of Muslim lands, and facilitated the 
acquisition of new landholdings to migrant settlers and 
corporations. Obviously, this law was designed to primarily 
serve the interests of the literate natives, moneyed 
bureaucrats, and American speculators who were 
knowledgeable and had access to manipulate the bureaucratic 
process so as to legalize claims based on false surveys.104 
D. LAND SETTLEMENT POLICIES  
To further advance the intent of American colonial 
rule to assimilate Muslims into the populations of 
Christian Filipinos in the other regions, several land 
settlement laws and policies were enacted. This opened 
Mindanao to migrant settlers from other regions of the 
country. Colonial resettlement programs of bringing non-
Moros to Moro lands began in 1911. This process continued 
into the late 1960s under the independent Philippine 
government and further intensified Moro dislocation.105    
Under the Public Land Acts of 1913, 1919, and 1925, 
Mindanao and all other fertile lands that the State 
considered to be unoccupied, unreserved, or otherwise un-
appropriated public lands were opened to homesteaders and 
corporations, despite the fact that indigenous peoples were 
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living on these lands. Beginning in 1913, the colonial 
government established agricultural colonies to encourage 
the immigration of landless farmers from Luzon and Visayas 
to the less populous areas in Mindanao.106  
Public Land Act No. 2874 of 1919, provided, as 
mentioned earlier, a manner of acquiring land ownership for 
the Muslims in Mindanao, under which a Muslim Filipino was 
allowed a maximum of 10 hectares in homestead lots, while 
24 hectares lots were permitted to be owned by non-Muslim 
Filipinos. This discrimination was aggravated by the fact 
that lands for Christians were titled before their owners 
had even arrived in Mindanao, while Muslims were required 
to go through the long and tedious process.107  
Government programs implemented under this law created 
seven agricultural settlements in a four-year period. These 
were established in the areas of Pikit, Silik, Paidu 
Pulangi, Pagalungan, Glan, and Talitay in the former empire 
province of Cotabato; and Momungan in Lanao Province. To 
facilitate closer Muslim-Christian working relations, these 
settlements were organized and designed in a way that 
Christian settlers were mixed and integrated with the local 
Muslims.108  
However, the idea of Muslims and Christians being 
mixed in one community did not sit well, as 
misunderstandings and hostilities often erupted between the 
two groups. The program also failed to improve much in the 
areas of farming and agriculture for the Muslims, who were 
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suspicious of the Christians’ intent and were 
understandably reluctant to adopt their ways. Meanwhile, 
Christian settlers gained much over the Muslims because of 
the subsidy and protection they received from the 
government.109  Thus, toward the 1970s, most of these areas 
had been developed and had become predominantly Christian. 
The initial settlers in Mindanao were not limited to 
living in the agricultural colonies. Manpower from other 
parts of the Philippines also migrated to Mindanao to meet 
demand for labor on plantations and logging concessions 
supported by the government.110 
E. COMMONWEALTH AND POST-COLONIAL LAND LAWS AND 
SETTLEMENT POLICIES 
Land settlement programs continued in Mindanao during 
the Philippine Commonwealth Government and the post-
colonial Philippine government period from 1935 to the 
1960s. Of the various purposes for Christian migration, 
Tuminez points to the following as significant reasons for 
the continued land settlement programs: 
 to mitigate “peace and order” problems with 
the Moros; 
 to give incentives to military trainees, who 
were given farms upon completion of their 
training; 
 to increase rice and corn production; to 
implement land reform programs; and  
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 to give land to communist/Huk111 rebels who 
had surrendered during the administration of 
President Ramon Magsaysay (1953–1957).112 
During the Commonwealth government, Legislative Act 
No. 4197, known as the “Quirino-Recto Colonization Act,” 
was enacted on February 12, 1935. It was the first law on 
land settlement in Mindanao under the Commonwealth 
government but became the turning point of land settlement 
program. This law declared settlement as the priority and 
only “lasting solution” to the problem in Mindanao and 
Sulu, thus setting aside other options as secondary. Jubair 
points to the fact that, by virtue of its name alone, this 
law indicated the government’s bias toward Mindanao in 
calling it a colony.113   
This law facilitated a massive influx of settlers on 
Mindanao under the full sponsorship of the government. With 
the commitment of support and the development of 
infrastructure, Mindanao became a “Promised Land” to many 
aspiring settlers who were encouraged to begin homesteads 
for themselves.114 With a significant increase in the number 
of migrant settlers, the government policy of prioritizing 
claims was based not on occupancy of land but on the filing 
of paperwork. This encouraged rampant land grabbing and 
speculation.115 The officials in the Bureau of Lands that 
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processed these claims were mostly Christians who connived 
with Christian claimants due to biases against the Muslims 
or, for the exchange of favors. Thus, newcomers simply 
squatted and began to cultivate land even prior to the area 
having been subdivided and awarded.116  
The influx of migrants in Mindanao further bloated as 
settlers other than those under the government settlement 
program, also arrived en masse. Families joined friends and 
relatives who had gone ahead, while the demand for labor by 
big corporations and logging companies likewise encouraged 
people from other regions to seek livelihood and fortune in 
Mindanao, the “Land of Promises.”117   
Commonwealth Act No. 141, signed into law by President 
Quezon in 1936, declared all Moro Ancestral land holdings 
to be public lands. With a simple piece of legislation, 
Muslims were effectively deprived of their ancestral 
holding and were made landless. This law allowed Muslims to 
apply for only up to four hectares of land while Christians 
were allowed up to 24 hectares, and corporations were 
entitled to 1,024 hectares.118  
Another law, Commonwealth Act No. 411, was enacted to 
create the National Land Settlement Administration (NLSA). 
This program gave priority to those with military 
backgrounds, allegedly in anticipation of the impending 
Japanese Invasion. The Muslims viewed this legislation as a 
mere cover story for the real motive, which was to prepare 
the settlers in case of hostilities with the Muslims. 
                     
116 Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 1997, 83. 
117 Tuminez, This Land is Our Land, 2007. 
118 Jubair, A Nation under Endless Tyranny, 1997,83. 
 46
Under the NLSA, three major settlement projects were 
opened, two in Cotabato Valley and one in the Koronadal 
Valley in Cotabato province. The project benefited about 
200 Christian families who were each given 12 hectares of 
farmland and financial assistance reaching up to 7.5 
million pesos.119 
In the early 1950s, the government created the 
Economic Development Corporation (EDCOR) under the control 
of the Philippine Army as part of President Magsaysay’s 
program for former communist rebels from Luzon. However, 
most of the beneficiaries under this program were not 
actually former rebel but former soldiers who had been 
deliberately placed in it to act as neutralizers.120 Other 
land settlement programs continued until the 1960s. 
F. IMPACT ON MUSLIMS IN MINDANAO 
The rapid spread of large Christian communities in 
Mindanao beginning in the 1930s had outnumbered the Moros 
who became a minority in their own homeland. As Bacani 
stresses, the proportion of Muslim inhabitants to the 
population of Mindanao declined by more than half, from 98 
percent to 40 percent by 1976, and to around 20 percent in 
1995. Correspondingly, less than 17 percent of property in 
Mindanao was still in the possession of Muslims. These were 
primarily in the less-developed parts of the countryside, 
leaving some 80 percent of Moros landless.121   
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According to Tuminez, the Muslim minoritization in 
certain areas of Mindanao created a wide disparity between 
the Muslim and non-Muslim populations. A 1918 census of the 
Cotabato region showed the Muslims as the majority 
population. However, the continued influx of non-Muslim 
settlers from 1918 to 1960 radically increased the 
Christian population in Cotabato to about ten times, 
eventually overwhelming the Muslims two-to-one by 1960.122  
According to another source, the Moro population in 
Cotabato significantly reduced by half, from 39 percent in 
1903 to about 20 percent in 1975.123  
In 1903, the Moros comprised about 76 percent of 
Mindanao’s population, but fell to a mere 23 percent in 
1960. As to land ownership, the majority of landowners in 
Mindanao and Sulu in 1912 were Moros, but by 1982 they 
represented about only 18 percent of total land 
ownership.124 
The establishment of government and corporate 
development projects in Mindanao further aggravated the 
discriminatory laws and policies that also displaced Moros 
and other indigenous peoples from their ancestral lands. 
During the Martial Law period, for example, Presidential 
Decrees were passed in response to the Mindanao problem, 
spurring the construction of hydroelectric plants and other 
energy projects that made Mindanao the venue of development 
programs. However, this was viewed as having benefited the 
outsiders more than the communities on whose lands these 
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projects were built.125 This was considered “land-grabbing 
by legal means” due to the massive land disenfranchisement 
of Moros and other indigenous groups.126 Further, land 
disputes arising from conflicting claims based on opposing 
conceptions of tenure caused land disputes between Muslims 
and non-Muslim settlers that became the main irritant in 
their relations.127 
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IV. RISE OF MUSLIM SECESSIONIST CONFLICT 
A. TRIGGERING CONDITIONS 
By the late 1960s and early 1970s, growing land 
conflicts further escalated into violent Muslim-Christian 
armed confrontations. Christian vigilante groups, known as 
the “Ilagas,” or “Rats,” and Muslim Private Armies called 
“Black Shirts” and “Barracudas” emerged in the Cotabato and 
Lanao Provinces.128 At this point, the land issue had become 
the main reason for brewing Muslim-Christian conflicts and 
animosities that turned into brutal ethnic violence.  
In 1967, the Philippine-Malaysian controversy over 
Sabah contributed to Muslim aspirations for self-
determination. The Philippine government conceived of a 
bold plan code-named “Operation Merdeka” to infiltrate and 
retake Sabah using Muslims. Under this plan, Muslim 
recruits called Jabidah Commandos went on a secret military 
training program on Corregidor Island in Luzon. However, in 
March, 1968, the plan turned into a catastrophe when about 
28 trainees were summarily executed by their military 
trainers for alleged mutiny. A lone survivor emerged to 
reveal what later came to be known as the “Jabidah 
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intensified Muslim outrage against the government’s unjust 
treatment of Muslims that rekindled separatist 
aspirations.129  
B. MUSLIMS’ RESPONSE 
These events led former Cotabato Governor Datu Untog 
Matalam to form the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in 
May, 1968, with the aim of asserting Muslim self-
determination and demanding an independent Islamic State 
for the areas of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan (MINSUPALA). 
The youth sector of the MIM later became the forerunner of 
the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF).130 From 1968 
until 1971, Muslim student organizations also engaged in 
various political campaigns to advocate the Moros’ right to 
self-determination as a distinct group of people.131 
In 1968, selected MIM members were sent to Pangkor 
Island, Sabah, Malaysia for guerilla warfare and political 
orientation training. These trainees later became the 
nucleus of the MNLF known as the “Group of 90,” “Group of 
300,” and “Group of 67.” The MIM was later renamed the 
Mindanao Independence Movement, but did not last for long 
after it was disbanded by the Philippine government in the 
early 1970s.132 This was seen as a threat by the Christians, 
who reacted by also organizing and arming themselves. 
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C. THE MORO NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (MNLF) 
In 1969, secularist Muslim students in Manila founded 
the MNLF. However, it was not until August 23, 1973, in 
Kolong-kolong, Palimbang, Sultan Kudarat, that the MNLF was 
officially made public and declared its aim of establishing 
a separate state out of Mindanao and Sulu called the 
Bangsamoro133 homeland.134 The leaders of the MIM trainees, 
headed up by Nur Misuari, formed the MNLF Central 
Committee.135 From 1969 to 1972, the MNLF operated initially 
as an underground organization while it focused on 
organizational build-up.  
Martial Law was declared in September 1972 by then-
President Marcos due to widespread civil unrest and threats 
of rebellion in the south, which caused Muslim resentments 
and grievances to explode into an armed rebellion.136 At 
this point in time, the MNLF had already gained the support 
of Muslims and had thus become the representatives of 
Muslim aspirations.137    
The MNLF, as Macapando Muslim underscores, “...emerged 
in the wake of a resurgence of Islamic identity among 
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Philippine Muslims who felt oppressed at the hands of the 
Christian-dominated government and marginalized in the 
Philippine body politic.”138 The MNLF took the lead among 
separatist movements representing the general Moro 
sentiment of oppression at the hands of a Christian-
dominated Philippine government.139 A month later, after the 
declaration of Martial Law, the Muslim secessionist 
movements under the banner of MNLF and led by Nur Misuari 
came out in the open and declared an armed rebellion 
against the Philippine government in Mindanao.  
1. Impact of the MNLF Rebellion 
The MNLF rebellion spread into key areas in Mindanao 
that eventually fell under rebel control, forcing massive 
deployment of government forces and resources to contain 
the conflict. The first phase of the insurgency from 1972 
to 1975 was extremely bloody. One estimate suggests that 
about 60,000 soldiers, guerillas, and civilians were 
killed.140  
During this period, the Organization of Islamic 
Conferences (OIC) recognized the MNLF and was granted 
observer status. Meanwhile, Libya and Malaysia provided 
logistical support to the MNLF. With external pressures 
from Islamic states sympathetic to the Muslim rebels, the 
conflict reached a stalemate.141 The cost in human lives and  
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destruction to property compelled the government to declare 
a ceasefire and eventually engage in peace talks with the 
rebels.142   
On December 23, 1976, the GRP-MNLF negotiations 
through the auspices of Libya concluded in the Tripoli 
Peace Agreement, ending the conflict in Mindanao.143 The 
establishment of Muslim Autonomy in the 13 provinces in 
Mindanao was the salient provision of the accord.144 
However, differences regarding the concept of creating an 
autonomous region, particularly about holding a plebiscite 
became a major issue between the GRP and the MNLF that 
prevented the agreement from fully attaining peace.145 
2. Organizational Split 
Unfortunately, the forging of the GRP-MNLF Tripoli 
peace agreement did not put an end to the Muslim Insurgency 
in Mindanao. Within the MNLF leadership, meanwhile, 
differences on the official stance over the Tripoli 
Agreement stirred internal rifts. Eventually, this led to 
the MNLF splitting into two secessionist factions. The more 
fundamentalist and religious-oriented leader Hashim 
Salamat, Vice-Chairman of the MNLF, broke away from the 
more nationalist and secularist-oriented Nur Misuari, to 
form the New MNLF faction (later to become the Moro Islamic 
Liberation Front or MILF). The official establishment of 
the MILF in 1984 resulted in two different approaches 
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within the Muslim secessionist movement. The MNLF remained 
on the secular path towards self-determination, while the 
MILF adopted a more uncompromising stance on Moro 
independence with more Islamic fundamentalist leanings.146    
3. Ceasefire Collapse and the Final Settlement with 
GRP 
By late 1977, the Tripoli Agreement collapsed as 
violations of the ceasefire were allegedly committed by 
government troops.147 The MNLF resumed its armed struggle, 
accusing the government of failure to implement the 
creation of the Autonomous Region in Mindanao as mandated 
by the Tripoli agreement.148 MNLF hostilities continued, but 
with much less intensity, as the MNLF’s strength was 
weakened by the organizational split with the MILF, 
defections, and the surrender of key officials to the 
government.149 Throughout the late 1970s and the 1980s, 
hostilities continued as the fundamental causes of the 
Muslim armed struggle remained unresolved.150 
The MNLF issue was finally settled in 1996, twenty 
years after the Tripoli Agreement, when the Ramos 
administration successfully negotiated for the GRP-MNLF 
Final Peace Agreement (FPA) through the mediation of OIC 
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and Libya.151 This facilitated the creation of the 
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, covering five Muslim 
dominated provinces and two cities, with Nur Misuari as the 
first Governor.152 The MILF strongly objected to the GRP-
MNLF FPA and remained firm in its stand that the solution  
of the Muslim problem is the establishment of an 
independent Islamic State in Mindanao, and not simple 
autonomy.153 
D. THE MORO ISLAMIC LIBERATION FRONT (MILF) 
As stated earlier, the GRP-MNLF Tripoli Peace 
Agreement in 1976 failed to put an end to the Muslim 
Insurgency in Mindanao. After the signing of the Tripoli 
Agreement, the more fundamentalist and religious leader 
Hashim Salamat, Vice-Chairman of the MNLF, broke away from 
the nationalist Nur Misuari to form the New MNLF “Salamat 
Faction.” Internal rifts within the secessionist movement’s 
leadership were aggravated by their differences in ideology 
and stand over the peace agreement, and led to another 
secessionist faction splitting of from the MNLF 
organization.154 The MILF is the primary exponent of Islamic 
fundamentalism in the Philippines.155 
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In March 1984, the New MNLF Salamat faction officially   
adopted the name of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front, and 
assumed the role as the Bangsamoro people’s representative 
in the struggle and aspiration for self-determination. 
Chairman Hashim Salamat stated that the MILF’s ultimate 
political objective is the establishment of a separate 
Islamic State in all areas where Muslims still exist as a  
majority in the southern Philippines.156 Salamat further 
argued that autonomy is not the answer to their political 
and social demands.157  
To attain its goals and objectives of a genuine 
Islamic State in Mindanao, with a government based on the 
Qur’an, the MILF adopted as its ideology, “La ilaha illa 
Allah Muhammad al rasul Allah,” meaning, “there is no God 
worthy to be worshipped but Allah” and that worship of God 
must be in accordance with the teachings of Prophet 
Muhammad.158  Thus, the main MILF strategy focused on the 
concepts of da’wah or Islamic call and Jihad.  
Da’wah stresses the revival of Islamic faith through 
the so-called “back to Islam” program for Muslims in 
Mindanao. Arabic schools called “Madrazah” were established 
to propagate the Islamic faith. Jihad or “struggle in the 
way of Allah,” on the other hand, calls for an organized 
and unified armed struggle to serve Islam by fighting 
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perceived oppressors of the faith or those who are blocking 
the Muslim aspirations of an Independent Islamic State in 
Mindanao.159 MILF breakaway groups like Hashim Salamat are 
mostly the Maguindanaon fighters from central Mindanao, 
while the remaining MNLF were dominantly composed of Tausug 
fighters from Sulu, like Misuari.160  
The MILF made itself known as a potent force during 
the new Aquino administration in 1987 when the government 
resumed negotiations with the MNLF in Jeddah, Saudi 
Arabia.161 Following the meeting, the MILF launched a 
weeklong series of offensives in central Mindanao against 
government installations.162  
Toward the late 1990s, the MILF, while engaged in 
initial talks with the GRP, also started to project a 
strong military posture in Mindanao. However, the 
implication of its elements in several atrocities and 
terrorist incidents in Mindanao, as well as its firm stance 
on the issue of independence as non-negotiable, prompted 
the Estrada Administration to declare an “all out war” 
against the MILF in 2000. Thereafter, major GRP-MILF 
hostilities broke out in central Mindanao that resulted in 
the capture of the major MILF camps by government forces.163  
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With an “all out peace” policy announced by the Arroyo 
government in 2001, the MILF returned to the peace process. 
This was interrupted in February 2003 when the GRP launched 
a major military campaign against MILF strongholds in 
Pikit, North Cotabato, to go after terrorist groups 
reportedly being harbored by the MILF.  
The hostilities lasted for a week and were timed to 
coincide with the Muslim celebration of the end of the Hajj 
or Holy Pilgrims, draw critics and protest from the Muslims 
followed by retaliatory attacks from the MILF.164 This 
prompted the government to suspend the talks. Nevertheless, 
talks resumed after the MILF officially denounced terrorism 
and expressed its willingness to cooperate with the 
government in pursuit of the terrorists.165  
Following the death of Hashim Salamat on July 13, 
2003, MILF Vice-Chairman for Military Affairs Al Haj Murad 
assumed the organization’s leadership.166 With Murad as the 
new MILF chairman, the next GRP-MILF talks held in Kuala 
Lumpur and facilitated by Malaysia tackled the third agenda 
on ancestral domain, the most complex and contentious issue  
in the peace talks.167 The talks continued until early 
August 2008 when the controversial issue over the signing 
of the MOA-AD erupted.  
The peace talks suddenly ended in a standoff and were 
indefinitely suspended. Meanwhile, MILF elements figured in 
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atrocities against Christian areas in Mindanao resulting in 
renewed hostilities with government forces. Since then, the 
issue of Ancestral Domain is one of the three substantive 
agenda in the GRP-MILF talks and has become the most 
contentious and controversial issue in efforts to settle 
the conflict.  
The provisions of the supposed Agreement between the 
GRP-MILF that was cancelled in August 2008 could have 
provided a significant solution to the land conflict in 
Mindanao. Accordingly, the MOA-AD allows significant 
recognition of the Bangsamoro historical claims of their 
Ancestral domain. Under the MOA-AD, the Bangsamoro 
Juridical Entity (BJE) will be created with similarly 
significant power and authority. However, most critiques 
have opposed MOA-AD due to its highly contentious 
substantive claims being viewed as unconstitutional.168 
E. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP (ASG) 
In the 1990s, the more radical and extremist-oriented 
Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) became the latest group to emerge 
from among the Muslim secessionist movements. The ASG aims 
to wage Jihad against the Philippine government’s 
atrocities committed against the Muslims in the 
Philippines, and seeks to establish an independent Islamic 
Bangsamoro Republic in Mindanao.169 The group’s core 
founders, led by Abdurajak Janjalani, were former MNLF 
members disgruntled over the dormancy of the secessionist 
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movement in the 1980s.170 Janjalani, a Middle East-educated 
Islamic scholar, was, with most of the core founders, 
veterans of the Afghan War in the 1980s against the 
Soviets. He formed the ASG in western Mindanao in 1991 
after returning from exposure to radical Islamism abroad.171 
However, the killing of its leader and founder 
Abdurajak Janjalani during a shootout with government 
troops in December 1998, shifted the ASG’s ideological 
focus to more on conduct of terrorist activities.172 The 
group’s involvement in terrorist activities and its 
reported links with the al-Qaeda network and the Indonesian 
network Jemaah Islamiyah placed the group’s name on the 
U.S. State Department’s list of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations.  
Since the U.S. declaration of GWOT after the 9/11 
incident, the ASG has become the target of an intensified 
joint Philippine-U.S. antiterror campaign in the southern 
Philippines. As of 2007, most of its leaders had been 
eliminated or neutralized. The group’s recent activities 
have significantly deviated from its original objectives 
into a purely localized terrorism and criminality. 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The study reveals that during the centuries predating 
colonization in the Philippines, the Muslims emerged as a 
dominant ethno-religious group in Mindanao and Sulu. They 
existed as sovereign and independent states and established 
their own system of government through the sultanates, 
which during those periods was the most advanced in the 
Philippines. They had also established diplomatic and trade 
relations with neighboring states.  
However, the coming of colonization in the 16th 
century threatened the Muslims’ domination and distinct 
identity. Since then, the Muslims in Mindanao have waged 
their struggles of resistance against foreign domination, 
first Spain, for more than three centuries, and then the 
United States, for another four decades.  
The assertion of Muslim self-determination and 
independence in Mindanao was widely manifested in the 
struggles during the colonial and post-colonial periods.173 
Confronted by the more superior American colonial forces in 
the early 1900s, the Moros were ultimately pacified and 
placed under colonial control. This event began the process 
that would eventually have a significant impact on the 
sociopolitical and economic aspects of the Muslims in 
Mindanao. 
American colonial laws and policies particularly on 
land ownership and migration disregarded the Muslim 
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traditional and customary laws practiced for centuries. The 
Muslims’ lack of comprehension and rejection of the legal 
processes of the colonial land laws made them reluctant to 
comply and so they refused to accept laws which were 
totally foreign to them. Further, migrant settlement 
policies opened the door for the organized coming of non-
Muslims to Mindanao under government protection. As a 
result, animosities and conflicts between the two groups 
began as Muslims lost ownership and were deprived of their 
lands while non-Muslim migrant settler groups grew bigger 
and acquire lands.  
When the Americans granted Philippine independence in 
1946, Mindanao was made part of the new republic despite 
earlier objections from the Muslims. Under the post-
colonial Philippine government, discriminatory American 
laws and policies towards the Moros were adopted. This 
further alienated and marginalized the Muslims who were 
dispossessed of their lands while several government 
programs supported migrant settlements. By the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, continued Christian migrations resulted in 
brewing Muslim-Christian violence over land conflicts. 
The famous “Jabidah massacre” incident on March 18, 
1968, the execution of Muslim recruits while on a secret 
military training for the government’s plan to invade and 
retake the Malaysian state of Sabah, created further 
outrage against the government’s unjust treatment of 
Muslims. These local events and the emerging Islamic 
consciousness among Muslim students exposed to significant 
world events in the late 1960s, triggered widespread anti- 
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government protest, and condemnation in Manila. This gave 
rise to Muslim secessionist movements. Buendia notes of 
these Muslim sentiments:  
They believe that their people have never been 
part of the Philippines and their current 
struggle is a continuation of their ancestors’ 
war for independence, which was first launched 
against Spanish and the American rule, and 
presently under the post colonial “Filipino-run 
Philippine state.”174 
A month after the Declaration of Martial Law in 1972, 
a major armed conflict erupted in Mindanao. Muslim 
secessionist movements under the banner of the MNLF 
declared an open armed rebellion against the Philippine 
government, and sought the establishment of an independent 
Bangsamoro state in Mindanao. The Muslim secessionist 
conflict has persisted for more than four decades while 
efforts to find a lasting solution have yet to be 
successful. In search of that solution, the issue of land 
and territory has become central to the agenda of the 
recent peace talks between the government and the Muslim 
secessionists represented by the MILF. Unfortunately, with 
the cancellation of the supposed MOA-AD between the GRP and 
the MILF last August 2008, and the subsequent standoff in 
the peace talks, a lasting solution to the Muslim 
secessionist conflict has remained unattainable. 
B. CONCLUSION 
The emergence of the Muslim secessionist conflict in 
the southern Philippines in the early 1970s is the 
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culmination of a long series of struggles against foreign 
domination (colonial and post-colonial), which eventually 
succeeded in government control over the Muslims in 
Mindanao. The laws and policies, particularly those on land 
ownership and migration, which were imposed on the Muslims 
in Mindanao during the colonial and post-colonial period 
significantly discriminated against and marginalized the 
Muslims, and became the fundamental cause of the Muslim 
secessionist conflict. For more than four decades, the 
conflict has persisted, while its solution has remained 
elusive. It has created instability has that hampered 
necessary economic development in the Philippines’ 
southernmost region.  
1. Loss of Muslim Domination and Ancestral Domain 
The advent of colonization in Mindanao in the early 
1900s began the process that reshaped the centuries-old 
Muslim socio-cultural, political, and economic way of life. 
Either by design or coincidence as a result of the policies 
of American colonial rule in a matter of decades the 
Muslims were stripped of their power, and their traditional 
ways and practices were diminished. The Muslim’s 
traditional system of governance, the sultanates, was 
replaced by systems of Western laws and policies to suit 
colonial designs. 
One significant impact is a change in the demographic 
makeup of the pre-colonial Mindanao from a Muslim-dominated 
region to non-Muslim dominated one during the post-colonial 
period. 
The land laws and policies of the colonial and post-
colonial period have discriminated against and marginalized 
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the Muslims, resulting in the loss of their lands and 
ancestral domains, and in their domination in Mindanao in 
favor of non-Muslim migrant settlers. The traditional 
Muslim laws practiced for centuries under the sultanates 
were totally disregarded and usurped by Western concepts, 
their rights were violated, and their identity as a 
distinct, sovereign, and independent group of people was 
eroded. According to Buendia, the marginalization of the 
Muslims in Mindanao from the sphere of Philippine 
development is historically rooted in colonial and post-
colonial land settlement and migration policy, which 
gradually dispossessed Muslims of their traditional and 
ancestral lands.175   
Under to these conditions, the Muslims were reduced to 
a minority in their homeland and subjected to the rule of 
government structures that were entirely new and different 
from their traditional concepts. The loss of ancestral 
lands to the majority Christian migrant settlers resulted 
in an economic, social, and political marginalization that 
generated Moro grievances. At the very root of the Muslim 
secessionist conflict is land ownership, and it is also the 
key to crafting a long-lasting peace in the region.176  
The persistence of the Moro conflict in Mindanao is 
centered on the issue of ancestral domain, which concerns 
land, resources, and governance. This underscores the  
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historical and legitimate foundation of Moro grievances 
that challenge the perceptions on Muslims as religious 
fanatics and terrorists.177  
2. Effects on Muslims in Mindanao 
At the height of the sultanates’ power before colonial 
rule, the Bangsamoro homeland covered the entire region of 
Mindanao, Palawan, the Sulu Archipelago, and even included 
the Malaysian State of Sabah (North Borneo). However, 
impact of discriminatory colonial laws and policies on land 
and migration of non-Muslims in Mindanao has reduced the 
Muslims into the minority in their homeland. Out of the 13 
provinces, the Muslims were concentrated only in about five 
provinces (provinces of of Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Basilan, Lanao 
del Sur and Maguindanao), and some municipalities of 
Zamboanga del Sur, Zamboanga Sibugay, Zamboanga del Norte, 
Lanao del Norte, North Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, South 
Cotabato, Sarangani, Davao Oriental, Davao del Sur, Davao 
del Norte, Compostela Valley and Palawan.178  
Lingga notes that due to this situation of diminishing 
territory, the Bangsa people saw the need to assert their 
rights over their homeland, and their self-determination.179   
3. Ancestral Domain Issue and the Settlement of the 
Muslim Secessionist Conflict 
Land issues have been the most fundamental concern of 
the Muslims and are crucial factor that drive the 
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secessionist conflict. The conflict arose because of 
different concepts of land ownership between the 
Christians, whose view of land as a private property is not  
understood by the majority of the Muslims, and the Muslims 
who view land as a communal good that cannot be owned by 
individuals.180 
The land issue remains a critical point in resolving 
the Muslim conflict. The state’s migration and land 
policies that caused the political and economic 
marginalization of the Moros have reflected the perception 
of the government’s prejudice and efforts to exploit the 
Muslims. For the Muslims, this perception of prejudice 
against them will only change with the return to their 
control of the land resources in Mindanao.181  
The issues of land ownership and ancestral domain are 
a significant factor in resolving the secessionist 
conflict. Tuminez believes that the Mindanao conflict has 
no easy solution, but that an understanding of ancestral 
domain and its potential resolution through Moro self-
determination may provide a new approach that increases the 
chances for long-term peace and development.182 The supposed 
signing of MOA-AD in the recent talks between the GRP and 
MILF, which was unfortunately cancelled, was a significant 
attempt to address the issues of land and ancestral domain.  
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